












































Supplementing Ames on Creativity
A Heideggerian Interpretation of Cheng
Chenyang Li
Of all concepts of classic Chinese philosophy, cheng 誠 is one of the most difficult to decipher. The matter is not only of translating the term into 
English or another language. Even in Chinese, its meaning is so indefinite 
and elusive that the prominent Chinese philosopher Zhang Dainian has 
called it “the most unintelligible concept in Chinese philosophy.”1 Yet, cheng 
is undoubtedly an important concept; no serious student of Chinese philoso-
phy can avoid encountering it.2 In this chapter, I examine various efforts that 
have been made to interpret cheng and show how these interpretations have 
shed light on different dimensions of the concept. I also show that, although 
Roger Ames has made important contributions in this regard, his interpreta-
tion is nevertheless lacking in an important way, and that a crucial aspect 
of cheng has yet to be elucidated. This lack can be filled by a Heideggerian 
reading.3 In such an interpretation, cheng is a mode of being human in the 
most fundamental sense. As an essential characteristic of humanity, cheng 
signifies authentic human existence. Through cheng, humanity, heaven, and 
the world become, and maintain, what they are and what they ought to be. 
Cheng reflects truth, creativity, and reality, the three key dimensions of the 
Confucian human ontology. To offer such a reading is not to suggest that 
ancient Chinese thinkers philosophized as Heidegger. It indicates, however, 
that different philosophical traditions can share important insights even though 
they may possess varied ways of thinking and justification. My focus here 
is on pre-Qin Confucian thought, primarily on cheng in the Great Learning, 











































134 / Chenyang Li
the Zhongyong, and the Mencius, the three classic texts in which cheng plays 
a substantial role. 
Interpretation of Cheng in English Scholarship
One of the earliest Western scholars who attempted to interpret cheng was 
James Legge. He interpreted cheng as “sincerity,” making it primarily an ethico-
psychological concept. According to The Oxford English Dictionary, “sincere,” 
the adjective form of “sincerity,” is derivative of the Latin word “sincerus,” 
meaning “clean, pure, sound.” In another interpretation, “sincerity” comes 
from the Latin word “sine,” i.e., “without,” and “cera,” i.e., “wax.” The word 
originally meant that good sculpture artists do not use wax to hide defects 
in their productions. In either reading, “sincerity” can mean the original state 
without artificial disguise. Legge used the word mainly as a psychological 
concept. One of the reasons he stuck to “sincerity” in interpreting cheng may 
be due to his taking on the Great Learning before tackling the Zhongyong 
in following the sequence of Zhu Xi’s Four Books. In the Great Learning, 
“cheng” is used in close connection to yi 意, “intention” or “determination.” 
It is evidently psychological in connotation. To make one’s yi “cheng” (誠其
意) means to set a sincere heart onto something. Legge also extended this 
translation to the Zhongyong. He wrote, 
The second clause of par. 5-誠之不可揜如此, appears altogether 
synonymous with the 誠於中必形於外, in the 大學傳 [Great Learn-
ing], chap. vi.a, to which chapter we have seen that the whole of 
chap. i, pars. 2, 3, has a remarkable similarity.4
Interpreting cheng as sincerity seems straightforward and unproblematic in 
the Great Learning. It is in the Zhongyong, however, that Legge encountered 
difficulties. Section 20 of the Zhongyong states: 
誠者, 天之道也。誠之者, 人之道也。誠者, 不勉而中。不思而得, 從
容中道, 聖人也。誠之者, 擇善而固執之者也。
Legge translated it as follows:
Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the 
way of men. He who possesses sincerity is he who, without an 
effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without the exercise of 
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thought; he is the sage who naturally and easily embodies the 
right way. He who attains to sincerity is he who chooses what is 
good, and firmly holds it fast.5 
“The way of Heaven,” however, is obviously not confined to the human person. 
Using “sincerity” as a psychological state to describe Heaven hardly makes 
sense. Recognizing the difficulty, Legge wrote,
However, we may be driven to find a recondite, mystical, meaning 
for 誠, in the 4th part of this work.6 
Commenting on Section 21, at the beginning of the 4th part of the Zhongyong, 
Legge wrote,
The ideal of humanity—the perfect character belonging to the 
sage, which ranks him on a level with Heaven—is indicated by 誠, 
and we have no single term in English, which can be considered 
as the complete equivalent of that character.7 
And he added quickly, 
The Chinese themselves had great difficulty in arriving at that 
definition of it which is now generally acquiesced in.8 
Legge’s case shows that, while his interpretation of cheng may work in the Great 
Learning, it is far from being appropriate when it comes to the Zhongyong. 
Wing-tsit Chan’s work on interpreting cheng seems to have been influ-
enced by Legge. For instance, Chan translated Section 20 of the Zhongyong 
in close resemblance to Legge, as follows: 
Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is 
the way of man. He who is sincere is one who hits upon what 
is right without effort and apprehends without thinking. He is 
naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a 
sage. He who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good 
and holds fast to it.9
Attributing sincerity to Heaven, Chan encounters the same problem as Legge. 
Following Legge, Chan translated “cheng zhe, wu zhi zhongshi (誠者, 物之終
始)” as “sincerity is the beginning and end of things.”10 However, if sincerity 











































136 / Chenyang Li
is a psychological state, how can it be the beginning and the end of things 
in the world? In an attempt to resolve this difficulty, Chan broadened his 
renditions of cheng and wrote,
The quality that brings man and Nature together is cheng, sincer-
ity, truth or reality. The extensive discussion of this idea in the 
Classic makes it at once psychological, metaphysical, and religious. 
Sincerity is not just a state of mind, but an active force that is 
always transforming things and completing things, and drawing 
man and Heaven (Tien, Nature) together in the same current.11 
Chan’s account points out a key meaning of cheng, namely, it is an active 
force that transforms things and completes things, and brings humanity and 
Heaven into unity. However, saying that this force is “sincerity” is clearly 
forced; the English word simply does not have such a connotation. Chan’s 
treatment seems to display Legge’s influence. Linking cheng to truth and reality 
brings it closer to the meanings of the word in the Zhongyong. Unfortunately, 
Chan did not elaborate on these linkages in explicating cheng. Commenting 
on cheng as a creative force, Chan wrote, “In so far as it is mystical, it tends 
to be transcendental.”12 Chan did not explain what he meant by “transcen-
dental.” If it means “beyond the human realm,” justifying such a reading is 
difficult, because in Confucianism the human realm is not separate from 
Heaven or earth.
Recognizing the difficulties associated with translating cheng as sincerity, 
both Donald Munro and A. C. Graham avoided psychologizing cheng and 
opted for “integrity.” Munro wrote,
My translation of cheng as “integrity” rather than “sincerity” comes 
from the term’s sense as a completeness that contains all natural 
attributes, none of which is fraudulent or missing.13
This rendering allows Munro to translate “cheng zhe, zi cheng ye 誠者, 自成也” 
in the Zhongyong as “integrity is that whereby things complete themselves.”14 
In cases like this, “integrity” clearly has an advantage over “sincerity.”
Graham expanded this rendering to the Great Learning, where “sincer-
ity” seems to have stronger grounding than “integrity.” He translated “cheng 
yi 誠意” as “integrating the intention.” He wrote,
Cheng “integrity” derives from cheng 成 “becoming whole,” used (in 
contrast with sheng 生 “be born”) of the maturation of a specific 
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thing . . . we use “integrity, integral, and integrate” to combine 
the two senses, wholeness and sincerity.15 
Using “integrity” for cheng, Graham translated Section 20 of the Zhongyong 
as follows: 
Integrity is the Way of Heaven, integrating is the Way of man. 
The man who is integral is on centre without endeavour, suc-
ceeds without thinking, is effortless on the Way; he is the sage. 
The man who integrates is one who chooses the good and holds 
on to it firmly.16 
Graham’s rendering seems to have been motivated by his effort to offer a con-
sistent interpretation of cheng in both the Great Learning and the Zhongyong. 
His translation of “cheng yi” as “integrating the intention” suggests that he 
read the meaning of cheng in the Zhongyong back into the Great Learning, or 
it would be difficult to comprehend how he came to the idea of “integrating 
the intention” from “cheng yi.” 
Munro apparently approached the matter in the opposite direction 
from Graham. For Munro, the proper meaning of cheng is “sincerity,” which 
“referred to the unwavering attempt to realize the specific social virtues.” Such 
an attempt is undoubtedly a human effort. On the basis of this, Munro asserted, 
“cheng was then read into nature.”17 Such a reading-back into nature can be 
found in the Mencius as well as in the Zhongyong, both of which belong to 
the Si-Meng School of Confucianism. Munro’s reading could be supported 
in two scenarios. First, the word “cheng” originally described a psychological 
state. Given the etymological connection of cheng 誠 with its homophone 成 
(to complete),18 however, such a conjecture is difficult to sustain. Second, the 
Great Learning, in which cheng carries a close psychological connotation, was 
written before the Zhongyong and the Mencius, in which cheng appears with 
broader meanings. However, Munro provided neither as evidence. Therefore, 
he has not convincingly established that cheng as a personal (psychological) 
state was read back into nature to acquire broader meanings such as integrity, 
truth, and reality. 
In his Centrality and Commonality, Tu Weiming followed Wing-tsit 
Chan’s interpretation of cheng, but emphasized its senses of “truth” and “real-
ity.” Tu wrote,
Cheng as the Way of Heaven is certainly different from “sincer-
ity” as a personal quality. To say that Heaven is sincere seems to 











































138 / Chenyang Li
translate the idea of an honest person into a general description 
of the Way of Heaven.19 
For Tu, however, such a reading of cheng back into the world is a misinter-
pretation. Unlike Munro, Tu maintained that, when the Zhongyong describes 
the way of Heaven as cheng, it does not say that Heaven is like a person. On 
the contrary, it means that cheng is unmistakably a quality of Heaven, and 
that humans should follow this heavenly quality to be cheng. Thus, Tu placed 
“sincerity” in quotation marks and considered cheng as “a primary concept 
in the construction of a moral metaphysics.”20 Toward that end, Tu quoted 
Lau’s translation of cheng in the Mencius for support. Lau interpreted cheng 
as “true.” For instance, the Mencius states:
反身不誠, 不悅於親矣. 誠身有道. 不明乎善, 不誠其身矣. 是故誠者, 
天之道也. 思誠者, 人之道也. 至誠而不動者, 未之有也. 不誠未有能
動者也. (4A12)
Lau translated the passage as follows:
If upon looking within he finds that he has not been true to 
himself, he will not please his parents. There is a way for him 
to become true to himself. If he does not understand goodness 
he cannot be true to himself. Hence being true is the Way of 
Heaven; to reflect upon this is the Way of man. There has never 
been a man totally true to himself who fails to move others. On 
the other hand, one who is not true to himself can never hope 
to move others.21 
“Being true” is key to Lau’s understanding of cheng. As Zhang Dainian 
maintained, there is a close affinity between the concept of cheng in Confu-
cianism and the concept of “zhen 真” (true, truth) in Daoism: “what Dao-
ists calls zhen, Confucians call cheng.”22 In this connection, it makes good 
sense to interpret cheng in terms of “truth,” as Lau did. Being true is a way 
of being for the person. It is not merely psychological, but also ethical and 
ontological. In this sense, Lau translated “bu ming hu shan, bu cheng qi shen 
yi 不明乎善, 不誠其身矣” as, “if he does not understand goodness he can-
not be true to himself.” This rendering is much better than either Legge’s 
(“if a man does not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in 
himself ”23) or Chan’s translation (“If one does not understand what is good, 
he will not be sincere with oneself ”24). Legge’s and Chan’s translations imply 
that understanding the good is a precondition of being sincere, and hence 
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one could understand what is good without being sincere. This implication 
is problematic because in Confucianism one has to learn to understand the 
good (or to become enlightened with the good), and dedication, including 
being sincere, is required in learning about the good. 
Aided by Lau’s interpretation, Tu went further to link cheng directly to 
the Confucian ideal of the unity of Heaven and humanity. Tu wrote, 
Cheng, so conceived, is a human reality, or a principle of subjec-
tivity, by which a person becomes “true” or “sincere” to himself; 
in so doing, he can also form a unity with Heaven.25 
Thus, in Tu, cheng is first of all a metaphysical concept. It refers to the human 
reality and the ultimate human existence in unity with Heaven. He maintains 
that such human existence is the unfolding, and hence the realization of the 
goodness in human nature (xing 性).26 From this perspective, cheng is not only 
existence but also activity, not only one of self-realization but also of helping 
to realize others in the world. In this sense, cheng is “creativity.” 
Drawing on Tu Weiming’s understanding of cheng in terms of creativ-
ity, Roger Ames and David Hall translated cheng as “creativity.” Ames and 
Hall wrote,
Construed by appeal to a world of process, both “sincerity,” as the 
absence of duplicity, and “integrity,” the state of being sound or 
whole, must involve the process of “becoming one” or “becoming 
whole.” The dynamic of becoming whole, construed aesthetically, 
is precisely what is meant by a creative process. It is thus that 
cheng is to be understood as creativity.27 
Reading “wu 物” in the Zhongyong as “process” or “event,” Ames and Hall thus 
interpreted “bu cheng ze wu wu 不誠則無物” as “without this creativity, there 
are no events.”28 Whereas Tu Weiming emphasized the religio-ontological sense 
of cheng and closely associated it with the unity of Heaven and humanity (tian 
ren he yi 天人合一), Ames and Hall focused on its sociopolitical meaning. 
On Ames and Hall’s “focus-field” ontology, human existence is to emerge in 
a social “field.” They wrote, 
We might appeal to the relationship between personal realization 
and the flourishing community to make this description of creativ-
ity more concrete. The basis of community is not a ready made 
individual, but rather a “functional” or “instrumental” inchoate 
heart-mind (xin 心) emergent from productive relations. It is 
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through communication that the knowledge, beliefs, and aspirations 
of the individual are formed. Human realization is achieved not 
by whole-hearted participation in communal life forms, but by life 
in community that forms one whole-heartedly. We do not speak 
because we have minds, but become like-minded by speaking to 
one another in a communicating community.29 
It should be noted that Ames and Hall did not deny that cheng has a psycho-
logical dimension. Even in that regard, however, they saw that “it describes a 
commitment to one’s creative purposes, a solemn affirmation of one’s process 
of self-actualization.”30 Nor did they rule out the sense of integrity from cheng. 
Integrity, to them, meant living in “trustworthy and true” relationships with 
fellow human beings. They said, 
Cheng translated as “creativity” underscores the integrative process 
itself, while its translation as “integrity” denotes the culmination of 
any such integrating process. Cheng as “sincerity” underscores the 
emotional tone—the subjective form of feeling—that makes this 
creative process uniquely perspectival. As we have suggested, the 
cluster of translations is present as a seamless range of meaning 
in each occurrence of the term cheng.31
Like Tu Weiming, Ames and Hall also regarded humanity as a “co-creating” 
force. While Tu called humanity the “co-creator” with Heaven, Ames and 
Hall maintained that humans are “co-creative beings that have a central role 
in realizing both individual selves and the eventful worlds around them.”32 
Understanding cheng in terms of creativity has enabled Ames and Hall to 
produce a powerful and apt translation of the important Section 23 of the 
Zhongyong: 
誠則形, 形則著, 著則明, 明則動, 動則變, 變則化 , 唯天下至誠為能化.
When there is creativity there is something determinate; when 
there is something determinate, it is manifest; when it is manifest, 
there is understanding; when there is understanding, others are 
affected; when others are affected, they change; when they change, 
they are transformed. And only those of utmost creativity (zhicheng 
至誠) in the world are able to effect transformation.33
In his more recent work of Role Ethics, Ames interprets cheng in Mencius 
7A4 in terms of both “integrative and creative.” He writes,
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The character cheng in this passage is conventionally translated 
as “sincerity” or “integrity.” In most occurrences in the classical 
corpus it does carry this meaning, and this Mencius passage is no 
exception. But in a processive and transactional world, sincerity 
is the bond that unites one in one’s relations with others, and 
that makes the process of personal co-creativity possible. Under 
such circumstances, “integrity” is not simply retaining what you 
“have” or being who you “are”: It is what you “do” and “become” 
in integrating effectively with family and community. Cheng is 
thus the ground of an integrative and creative process of becoming 
consummately human.34 
In doing so, Ames connects the dots between “sincerity,” “integrity,” and “cre-
ativity.” His interpretation culminates in creativity, with both ontological and 
ethical significance. As a creative process, cheng is in close connection with 
the notion of “shengsheng 生生” (creative creativity) in the Yijing. 
However, there are two weak links in Ames’s conceptualization of the 
various meaning of cheng. First, while taking “creativity” as its core meaning, 
Ames nevertheless has accepted “sincerity” as one unquestionable interpreta-
tion and has moved too quickly in embracing it into his understanding of 
cheng. Ames takes cheng in the sense of sincerity to be “an essential affec-
tive ground for deepening one’s relations with others, and in so doing, for 
achieving real personal growth.”35 He writes, “sincerity is the bond that unites 
one in one’s relations with others, and that makes the process of personal 
co-creativity possible.”36 In his view, being sincere to others enables one to 
strengthen human relationships and to be better prepared in joining the 
co-creative process in the world. In this understanding, cheng as sincerity 
pretty much stays within the psychological and social dimensions. It is not 
framed explicitly as a special mode of being true in the ontological context 
of human being. Second, as far as Ames bases his interpretation on ontology, 
his ontological view is too fluid, too unstructured. The sense of “reality” that 
Tu Weiming has endeavored to expound is left out or simply consumed in 
Ames’s extensive processive ontology. In his philosophical framework, Ames 
gives little room to “being,” to the human reality; everything is in the flux 
of “becoming.” Reality has been replaced with process. Persons have been 
dissolved into relations. In this respect, Ames has departed too far from the 
worldview as developed by the ancient Confucians. 
In my view, conceptually, the dimension of sincerity in cheng should be 
grounded in the notion of human reality. The human being has its relatively 
steady structure; it is not always in flux. In an important sense, one can step 
into the same river more than once. We need to preserve what D. C. Lau 
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and Tu Weiming have accomplished in deciphering the notion of cheng. In 
their view, the “sincerity” dimension of cheng is best understood as being 
true to oneself and to others. We should understand sincerity as a mode of 
being, as being true. Being true is being, or more precisely, a state of being, 
a way of being. Only in this understanding, only by grounding it on being 
true can we closely connect sincerity as a psychological concept to cheng as 
a more fundamentally ontological or metaphysical concept.  
Following this line of thinking, we can say that the Confucian notion of 
cheng possesses three main dimensions.37 First, it is trueness or truth. In this 
sense, to be cheng means being true to oneself, to other people, and to the 
world. Being true is a matter of truth. This meaning encompasses sincerity (i.e., 
being sincere) but frames it on an ontological ground. When understood as 
a person’s internal state, sincerity is not purely a mental property; it is also a 
way of ones being who he is and what he is. It suggests authenticity. A sincere 
person is a true or truthful and an authentic person.38 Second, cheng implies 
creativity. One important characteristic of cheng in the Zhongyong is that 
cheng has the capacity to transform the world. It can complete itself (cheng ji 
成己) and complete things (cheng wu 成物). Such a process never ceases (wu 
xi 無息). Together with truth, this meaning of creativity covers the two senses 
that Munro uses for “integrity,” namely wholeness and sincerity. Munro uses 
“wholeness” to express cheng’s role in completing oneself and others. This 
sense is better communicated in terms of “creativity” as Ames and Hall have 
admirably shown. Third, cheng means reality. It does not just refer to whatever 
there is. Reality in the sense of cheng signifies how the world truly exists. As 
Tu Weiming remarked, “cheng definitely points to a human reality which is 
not only the basis of self-knowledge but also the ground of man’s identification 
with Heaven.”39 In Confucianism, this ground is the ultimate reality.
A Heideggerian Approach
How are truth, reality, and creativity related in cheng? How can we link these 
three dimensions of cheng together conceptually to better make sense of the 
concept? I believe that Heidegger’s scheme of truth can shed important light 
on this question. Like Ames, Heidegger’s world is far from being static, but 
it is not as fluid and processive as Ames’s either. By situating Da-sein’s world 
within referential contextuality, Heidegger provides a framework of being 
with appropriate stability. His framework enables creativity to take place with 
reality, enables reality to serve as a fertile ground for creativity and truth, and 
enables truth to become realized through creativity. 
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Countering the prevailing conception of truth in the West, Heidegger 
developed a notion of truth through an ontological twist, or a “return” to 
its Greek roots, as he saw it. In both Being and Time and On the Essence of 
Truth, Heidegger explicitly criticized the Western traditional concept of truth 
that reduces truth to a matter of “correctness” of the relation of the intellect 
to the known object. Heidegger objected to the notion that an assertion can 
“agree” with an object or reality, which is a non-assertion.40 He maintained 
that truth cannot possibly have the structure of an agreement between 
knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) 
to another (the object). Correspondence between the statement and the 
thing cannot signify a thing-like approximation between dissimilar kinds of 
things.41 
Then, what can truth be? Heidegger proposed:
To say that a statement is true means that it discovers [uncov-
ers] the beings in themselves. It asserts, it shows, it lets beings 
“be seen” (apophansis) in their discoveredness [uncoveredness]. 
The being-true (truth) of the statement must be understood as 
discovering [uncovering].42 
For Heidegger, an assertion can “correspond with” or be “in agreement with” 
an object only in the sense that an assertion points out or reveals what has 
been hidden. The truth of an assertion, or more appropriately, an assertion’s 
being true, lies in its “being-uncovering.” 
If a statement’s being true lies in its “being-uncovering,” and if that is 
the essence or underlying meaning of truth, then non-linguistic entities can 
also be true, namely, when they are encountered in Da-sein’s world of ref-
erential functionality and get fully uncovered in the way they are what they 
are. For instance, a hammer is being true when the being of the hammer 
is unveiled in the world—when it is found in a context in which hammers 
exist; when a hammer functions in a typical hammering way, not as, say, a 
paperweight. Thus understood, the “locus” of truth is not in language per se, 
but in the entire realm of being. The ontological status of being true is no 
longer merely that of knowing, but also that of being. The semantic concept 
of truth now has turned into an ontological one with a shift in emphasis 
from “being true” to “being true.” 
Heidegger regarded truth as “true-being” or “being-true (Wahrsein),” 
and defined “being true” as “aletheia (ἀλήθεια).” He used three terms for 
truth: unveil/reveal (enthüllen), uncover/discover (entdecken), and disclose 
(erschliessen). Heidegger explained the difference between them as follows: 











































144 / Chenyang Li
We shall call the unveiling of an extant being—for example, nature 
in the broadest sense—uncovering. The unveiling of the being that 
we ourselves are, the Da-sein, and that has existence as its mode 
of being, we shall call not uncovering but disclosure, opening up.43 
In uncovering and disclosing entities, Da-sein opens up its world of being 
and realizes truth. 
Da-sein’s being-true makes the truth (trueness) of entities possible. 
Then, in what way does Da-sein uncover entities in the world? Heidegger 
maintains that Da-sein cannot uncover entities unless it is itself disclosed to 
the world. He uses “disclose” (erschliessen) and “disclosedness” to mean “to 
lay open” and “the character of having been laid open.”44 To say that Da-sein 
is laid open is to say that Da-sein is being-in-the-world in which Da-sein 
unveils itself in a referential whole; it is within this referential totality that 
Da-sein makes sense of its being. Only within this holistic contexture are 
things what they are in the way they are, and thus have meaning. In other 
words, the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is grounded in the 
world’s disclosedness; and disclosedness is the basic character of Da-sein “in 
accordance with which it is its ‘there [Da].’ ”45 
In this disclosedness Da-sein obtains familiarity with its world, and upon 
this familiarity lies the very possibility of Da-sein’s explicit ontologico-existential 
interpretation of relations and entities in the world.46 The disclosedness in the 
form of familiarity is, in turn, constitutive of Da-sein. In this disclosedness 
lies the very being of Da-sein. In such a way, truth is a fundamental character 
or state (existentiale) of Da-sein; or in Heidegger’s own words, disclosedness 
is the primordial truth and the truth of existence.47 He stated,
In that Da-sein essentially is its disclosedness, and, as disclosed, 
discloses and discovers [uncovers], it is essentially “true.” Da-sein 
is “in the truth.”48
Heidegger maintained that the above assertion has meaning ontologically. 
Instead of an “agreement” between two things, truth is that in which Da-
sein uncovers entities in the world. It is a way of Da-sein’s being—“a being 
toward discovered [uncovered] beings.”49 In truth, whereas entities are being 
uncovered, Da-sein is being disclosed and is uncovering. The “roots” of 
entities being what they are in the world can only be found in Da-sein, and 
the foundation of their being true is in Da-sein. Truth is a way of being of 
Da-sein itself, of Da-sein’s existence. 
In this understanding, truth in its primary sense is the disclosing of Da-
sein; when Da-sein uncovers entities, truth is manifested through the being of 
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entities. Thus, entities are true in the secondary sense, namely when they are 
uncovered by Da-sein.50 Semantic truth, truth as a characteristic of a statement, 
comes only in the tertiary sense, only when entities are uncovered as being true 
through Da-sein’s being in the truth. For instance, the statement that “this is 
a hammer” is true when it uncovers the object in question as a hammer; the 
hammer is what it is, i.e., acquires its true being, when it is uncovered in Da-
sein’s world of referential nexus, which obtains only because Da-sein discloses. 
Accordingly, a statement is true when it works to uncover entities in ways they 
are in the world. Entities obtain their being and hence their true existence 
when they are uncovered by Da-sein. Da-sein is not only the ultimate source 
of truth, but also the ultimate source of reality, in the sense that things exist 
as they are only within Da-sein’s world of a meaningful referential framework.
Now let us see how a Heideggerian reading of the Confucian cheng can 
help us grasp the linkage of various dimensions of this notion. We begin with 
the meaning of truth. As indicated by Zhang Dainian, cheng in Confucianism 
is the counterpart of “truth” (zhen 真) in Daoism.51 Zhen means being true 
or truthfulness, as opposed to artificiality (wei 偽). This sense is reflected in 
the notion of cheng in Confucianism. Zhang used as an example the state-
ment of “xiu ci li qi cheng 修辭立其誠,” namely, the purpose and criterion for 
good writing (scholarship) is truth or truthfulness.52 In the Mencius, cheng is 
used in a similar sense. For instance, the text records a conversation in which 
Mencius’s interlocutor said, “Confucius said, at that time the world was in 
great danger. Was what he said not true (cheng)?”53 In usages like this, cheng 
has to do with beliefs and statements being true. Cheng also refers to a per-
son’s psychological state. In discussing the sage King Shun’s attitude toward 
his brother, Mencius said that Shun “truly believed (cheng xin 誠信) him and 
was happy for him; where is disingenuousness?”54 In this use, cheng expresses 
the meaning of sincerity. Cheng as a quality of knowing and cheng as a state 
of psychological activity are special modes of being true in the sense of truth. 
They are manifestations of being true to oneself and are rooted in being true 
to oneself. A person who is true to oneself must be sincere toward oneself 
and toward others, and must have a clear sense of reality without delusion. 
In the Zhongyong, being true to oneself is called cheng shen (誠身), or “to 
make oneself true.” If we are to force this expression in English, we would 
say “to true oneself,” with “true” used as a verb.55 To true oneself is to open 
oneself up, to make oneself authentic. Along this line, Tu Weiming wrote: 
The person who embodies cheng to the utmost is also a most 
genuine human being. It is in this sense that he completely real-
izes his own nature. The person who realizes his own nature to 
the full becomes a paradigm of authentic humanity.56 
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For the Mencian branch of Confucianism, to which the Zhongyong is attributed, 
human nature is Heaven-endowed and hence is in accord with the Way.57 To 
be authentic is to be true to one’s nature. 
In Heidegger, Da-sein’s being true is in its disclosedness. Heidegger said 
in an interview that “man is only man when he stands within the disclosing 
of being.”58 That is, a human is human in the proper sense only when one 
stands in truth. When Da-sein discloses, it manifests authenticity and uncov-
ers entities in the world. Heidegger wrote,
Da-sein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-
of-being. This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon of 
the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most 
primordial and authentic disclosedness in which Da-sein can be 
as a potentiality-of-being is the truth of existence.59
Being-true is the authentic way of Da-sein’s being. It is the ultimate realiza-
tion of Da-sein’s innermost potentiality-for-being. Da-sein’s disclosedness and 
authenticity do not consist in conforming to anything; it is Da-sein’s way of 
being-in-the-world through choosing its choice in life. Authenticity, however, 
does not mean that Da-sein simply chooses a way of being, not even just 
a unique way of being. Many people more or less choose their ways of life, 
yet they may not all be said to be authentic. Authenticity requires Da-sein 
to choose the way that it has to choose. In this sense, there is an apparent 
paradox: on the one hand, Da-sein is free and makes its own choice; on the 
other, its choice ought not to be just any choice. For Heidegger, authenticity 
is linked to the unique singularity of Da-sein’s own death. Heidegger wrote,
The more authentically Da-sein resolves itself, that is, understands 
itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost eminent possibility 
in anticipating death, the more unequivocal and inevitable is the 
choice in finding the possibility of its existence.60 
Da-sein as being-toward-death brings with it the finitude of existence. This 
finitude takes Da-sein back from its endless possibilities “nearby” and to 
“the simplicity of fate,” namely “a possibility that it inherited and yet has 
chosen.”61 This statement points to a constructed common humanity shared 
by authentic human beings.
By Taylor Carman’s account, Heidegger’s authenticity consists in two 
components: resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) and forerunning (Vorlaufen).62 It 
is a kind of hybrid of Aristotelian phronēsis and Kierkegaardian faith.63 With 
the former, one needs to exercise practical wisdom because an authentic life 
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is not prescribable from any rule book. On the latter, there is no absolute 
assurance in life; ultimately, one has to make up one’s mind on how to live. In 
comparison, Charles Guignon’s reading is more concrete and brings it much 
closer to the Confucian conception of cheng. Interpreting authenticity largely 
from Heidegger’s negation of inauthenticity, Guignon emphasizes that, contrary 
to just drifting along with the latest trends, authentic Da-sein “remembers” 
its rootedness in the wider unfolding of its culture, and
[i]t experiences its life as indebted to the larger drama of a shared 
history. As a result, authenticity involves encountering one’s pos-
sibilities as drawn from the “wellsprings” of a “heritage” and living 
one’s life as part of the “mission” or “destiny” definitive of one’s 
historical community as a whole. (BT 435−36)64
This way of reading differentiates Heidegger from the radical, “naked” free-
dom of Sartrean existentialism. For Heidegger, authentic existence is rooted 
profoundly in its destiny, namely “the occurrence of the community, of a 
people.”65 Heidegger concluded, “the fateful destiny of Da-sein is and with its 
‘generation’ constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Da-sein.”66 Being 
authentic is not only being true to oneself, but also to one’s community, or 
even more broadly, to humanity. 
In Heidegger, Da-sein’s being true is closely connected to its world of 
existence. In the sense of “world” relevant to our discussion here, it denotes 
the human reality. He said, 
“Worldliness” is an ontological concept and designates the struc-
ture of a constitutive factor of being-in-the-world . . . “World” is 
ontologically not a determination of those beings which Da-sein 
is essentially is not, but rather a characteristic of Da-sein itself.67 
Da-sein’s world is with “a contexture of functionality.”68 Without it, entities 
cannot be what they are in the world. Therefore, “There is” [“gibt es”] truth 
only insofar as Da-sein is and as long as it is. Beings are discovered only 
when Da-sein is, and only as long as Da-sein is are they disclosed.”69 This 
does not necessarily mean that Heidegger was an idealist.70 However, as far 
as the world in which we live is already and always a humanized world, our 
“worldliness” is undeniably a human creation. Moreover, Da-sein for Hei-
degger will be not mere presence in the sense in which the word “existence” 
is often used in modern philosophy. Da-sein means “to be there.” It is more 
analogous to an act, a happening, and hence a process, than to a status (what 
stands, what remains). However, such a happening always takes place against 
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a background of Da-sein’s contextual framework that is already “there.” Da-
sein’s being-in-the-world means participatory creation of the humanized world 
and participatory enrichment of the world in a fundamental way. In such 
an important sense, truth as Da-sein’s disclosedness and uncovering in the 
world is creation. Heidegger did not use the term “creation,” which is usu-
ally associated with God in the West. We can use the word in the sense of 
establishment or attainment because, in Heidegger, Da-sein’s world is one that 
can be established and obtained only with its disclosedness and uncovered-
ness. Da-sein’s disclosedness not only bestows on the world its “worldliness,” 
thereby making it an undisputable reality, but also maintains it as such. The 
foundation of reality in Da-sein’s worldliness lies in its truth.
This kind of creation or establishment is not the kind that Kant 
attributes to the “Ich denke” (“I-think”), because Heideggerian creation is 
achieved through Da-sein’s deep involvement in the world. “To be” in the 
world is not merely to think; Da-sein is involved in the world by such ways 
as understanding (Verstehen), forerunning (befindlichkeit), and care (Sorge). 
Furthermore, Da-sein’s creation should be understood as mutual-creation, 
in which Da-sein both shapes its world and at the same time is shaped by 
it. I will label this mutual transformational relationship “bi-creation.” Unlike 
the common notion of creation by God, bi-creation is not creatio ex nihilo 
(creation out of nothing).71 In bi-creation, Da-sein generates meaning for its 
world and enriches its referential framework of functionality and meaning. 
In the meantime, Da-sein is also inevitably shaped, or re-created anew in 
its world. Da-sein is “thrown” into the world that already exists in the first 
place. But, Da-sein is not a passive entity and is fundamentally different in 
that Da-sein re-acts to the world and is able to shape and re-shape its world. 
Da-sein finds itself in a world with forests, rivers, mountains, and wind. 
Through disclosedness Da-sein makes this world filled with timber, water 
power, and quarries of rock.72 The world in the latter sense, with a “worldli-
ness” in Heidegger’s characterization, is an outcome of Da-sein’s bi-creation. 
It is the reality in which Da-sein finds itself. Thus, in Da-sein’s disclosedness 
emerges truth, creativity, and reality. 
Now we return once again to the Confucian notion of cheng. In order 
to achieve trueness to oneself, a person needs to illuminate goodness (ming 
shan 明善). Goodness, as illustrated in the Zhongyong, is not something read-
ily available as a given, but something to be established through the human 
co-creation with Heaven. The active human participation in the Heavenly way 
is humans “being true.” This process can also be characterized as bi-creation. 
On the one hand, humanity is not an arbitrary creator in any sense. It is 
destined toward the Way of Heaven. Individual persons need to cultivate 
themselves in order to come into attunement with the Way. On the other hand, 
SP_BEH_CH07_133-156.indd   148 1/17/18   9:53 AM











































humanity is definitely a creative force and aims to bring out a humanized 
world. This is not to say that human beings create mountains and rivers on 
earth (though they could). But it is through human creation that this world 
becomes a morally significant human reality. It is in the process of humanizing 
the world, human beings themselves become (more fully) humanized. It is 
in the process of co-creating the world, humanity becomes re-created. To be 
cheng is to be true to one’s Heavenly endowed nature, and to be true to one’s 
Heavenly endowed nature is to realize it in the world. In this process there 
is transformational creativity. Section 26 of the Zhongyong states, 
Cheng is ceaseless. Being ceaseless, it is lasting. Being lasting, it 
is manifesting. Being manifesting, it is infinite. Being infinite, it 
is extensive and deep . . . It is because it is infinite and lasting 
that it can complete all things.73 
As such, cheng is the force that not only enables us to complete ourselves, 
but also to complete all other things in the world.
Conceived as creativity, Tu Weiming wrote about cheng as follows,
[Cheng] is that which brings about the transforming and nourish-
ing process of heaven and earth. As creativity, cheng is “ceaseless” 
(bu xi 不息). Because of its ceaselessness it does not create in a 
single act beyond the spatiotemporal sequence. Rather, it creates 
in a continuous and unending process in time and space. It is 
therefore a “lasting” (jiu 久) event.
Thus,
It is simultaneously a self-subsistent and self-fulfilling process of 
creation that produces life unceasingly.74
In Ames and Hall’s description, 
Creativity (cheng 誠) as a transactional, processive, and coopera-
tive endeavor, has the element of affirming things as they are and 
participating in the process of drawing out novel possibilities from 
the circumstances.75 
The Confucian world is never a given, static world. It is co-created by human-
ity with Heaven and is constantly renewed. Cheng represents such a perpetual 
dynamism in such a world.
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As the true human way of being, cheng is to be achieved and realized in 
the human co-creation with Heaven. It points to the ultimate yet ever changing 
reality, of which humans are a part. This human reality, it should be noted, is 
not confined to the human person; it is manifest in the entire realm of human 
existence. It implies that in actualizing our Heaven-endowed nature into real-
ity, we make our world a human world. Such a world is a “furnished” one, 
one with all kinds of entities in relationship with humanity. In the Confucian 
view, without cheng such a reality is impossible, since humanity is not only a 
creative force but also a constituting party in its realization. The Zhongyong 
states, “without cheng there is nothing 不誠無物.” In Confucianism, creativity 
and reality are the two sides of the same coin of cheng. The concept of cheng 
encompasses the idea and the ideal that, in being true, humanity co-creates 
the worldly reality with Heaven. 
Finally, it should be noted that cheng in Confucianism should not be 
understood as a finalized state in a person. Rather, it is a process that calls 
for constant renewal. In Heidegger, truth does not exist apart from untruth. 
He wrote,
The full existential and ontological meaning of the statement 
‘Da-sein is in the truth’ also says equiprimordially that ‘Da-sein 
is in untruth.’76 
Falling is characteristic of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world. Its falling into untruth 
is by no means accidental. For Heidegger, the world is a “with-world,” always 
the one shared with others.77 This characteristic determines that Da-sein is 
not free from everyday falling. Heidegger said, 
The self of everyday Da-sein is the they-self which we distinguish 
from the authentic self, the self which has explicitly grasped itself. 
As the they-self, Da-sein is dispersed in the they and must first 
find itself. This dispersion characterizes the “subject” of the kind of 
being which we know as heedful absorption in the world nearest 
encountered. If Da-sein is familiar with itself as the they-self, this 
also means that the they prescribes the nearest interpretations of 
the world and of being-in-the-world.78 
In the dispersion of the “they,” Da-sein follows the convenient and usually 
popular interpretations of the world. This is so because, in an everyday 
manner, the “they” itself articulates the referential context of significance 
for Da-sein. Furthermore, because Da-sein is essentially “being-with,” the 
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“they” is essentially part of Da-sein’s positive constitution.79 Paradoxically, 
Da-sein’s authentic being is not a state detached entirely from the “they,” 
“but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential.”80 In 
its existentiell as well as existential being, Da-sein is at both the ontic and 
ontological level. Not free from the “they” in its everydayness, Da-sein’s life 
is at once both authentic and unauthentic. These two types of existence do 
not and cannot exclude one another. They both constitute Da-sein’s being. 
Because of this co-occurrence, the very being of Da-sein is in tension, hence 
in a struggle, between truth and untruth. Just as there are various degrees 
of inauthenticity, there can be various degrees of authenticity with Da-sein. 
To live an authentic life is thus to be constantly on guard against falling into 
untruth. Thus, living an authentic life is like Sisyphus rolling the stone uphill: 
one may never overcome the struggle between truth and untruth, yet it is in 
this struggle that truth takes place. 
Similarly, Confucians see self-realization through cheng as a constant 
life-long endeavor. The very notions of self-realization and self-cultivation 
imply that one is not yet fully cheng, that there are both truth and untruth. 
A person of full truth is one who is completely one with Heaven. Confucius 
is said to have achieved this stage when he was seventy years old. Confucius 
supposedly became a “sage.” Presumably, this rarely happens among ordinary 
people. In effect, therefore, the Confucian belief is that one’s struggling between 
cheng and uncheng, truth and untruth, never ends. Cheng is forever ceaseless.
To conclude, a Heideggerian reading sheds new light on our understand-
ing of the Confucian notion of cheng. From such a perspective, we can see 
cheng as being true to oneself, as a creative force, and as a human reality. In 
Heidegger, Da-sein’s authentic existence requires it to disclose and uncover, 
which can be understood as a creative process that makes beings in the world 
meaningful and serves as the foundation of the reality of its “worldliness.” 
In the same vein, cheng is the mode of human existence in which human-
ity obtains its authentic being by transforming the world into a humanized 
world. In being true to oneself, the person of cheng co-creates with Heaven 
a human reality and achieves one’s authentic existence by promoting the Way 
in the world. In this sense, cheng is trueness (truth), creativity, and reality. 
Perhaps the difference of fluidity of being between Heidegger and Ames is a 
matter of degree, since both see the human reality as a generating process. 
Nevertheless, by setting human creativity within an already established yet 
continually renewing referential framework, Heidegger’s philosophy presents 
more stability for being than Ames provides. A Heideggerian reading of cheng 
furnishes a root metaphor that serves as a foundation for comprehending all 
three dimensions of cheng.81
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